LESSON PLAN
CIVIC ACTION AND COMMUNITY PROGRAMMING
(PHILIPPINES—A CASE STUDY)
303.5

CIVIL AFFAIRS IN THE COLD WAR 41-A-F6
US ARMY
CIVIL AFFAIRS SCHOOL
Fort Gordon, Georgia
AUGUST 1962
LESSON TITLE: Civic Action and Community Programming
(Philippines - A Case Study)

COURSE: Civil Affairs in the Cold War, 41-A-F6

SUBJECT: Cold War, Organizations and Programs

LESSON OBJECTIVE: To familiarize students with the successful civic action programs of the Philippine government as a vital tool in combating insurrection and as a means of giving social and economic stability.

COMPONENTS:
- Cover Sheet
- Lesson Plan Manuscript

TRAINING AIDS:
- Blackboard, Chalk, Eraser, Pointer.

TIME REQUIRED: 100 Minutes

Date Prepared: August 1962

Prepared by: Capt Richard L. Layfield

Approved by: Col W. R. Swarm
SECTION I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

I. The Move Toward Independence.

A. The transition from U. S. control to that of a Commonwealth.
   1. On November 15, 1935, the largest crowd in the history of the Philippines assembled in front of the Legislative Building and in the park facing it. It was estimated at not less than a quarter of a million. These Filipinos had come to see and celebrate the inauguration of the Commonwealth and of Manuel Quezon and Sergio Osmeña as its President and Vice President.

   In the inauguration ceremony the United States was represented by Vice President Garner, Secretary of War Dern, the Speaker of the House and several other members of the Congress and by the last Governor General, Frank Murphy, whose status changed that day from Governor to High Commissioner. The national anthems were sung, and the Philippine flag was run up alongside the Stars and Stripes.

   The speeches were short, and for the most part grave. The leaders pledged their services as responsible leaders of the people.

   A most important factor was that the President and Vice President had been elected by the voice of the people.

   2. Commonwealth Problems. The physical transition to the Commonwealth took place with barely a ripple. High Commissioner Murphy moved into a suite at the Manila Hotel until a suitable residence could
be found or built, and Mr. Quezon moved into Malcanang Palace. On November 16, government business went on as usual.

The Commonwealth faced problems of life and death. These problems were: Economic survival and national defense. The projected closing of the American market precipitated the first; the militant expansion of the Japanese Empire made the second a grim reality.

It was hard for the Filipinos to realize the extent of the threat to their economy that they had so enthusiastically accepted. The United States had made provisions for export taxes to begin in five years from the date of the commonwealth, and even at that time the revenue would be turned back to the Philippine government. The financial assistance which the United States gave the Filipinos in agriculture freed greatly needed funds for other projects. The United States had, for many years, levied the customary Federal excise tax on Philippine cigars in the American market and then returned the proceeds to the Philippines. The same action was to be followed on cocoanut oils.

No challenge could be made to the thesis that the United States action was honorable and high-minded. Its net result, however, was to channel back into the Philippine economy a sum roughly equivalent to the expectable government revenue from all other sources in any given year. This was the "windfall" often referred to. It enabled the Philippine government to embark on ambitious programs of public works, to build needed roads, schools, and hospitals, and to give the legislature a "pork-barrel" holiday with specific sums allocated for each district. Insofar as the additional revenue was directly translated
into a change for the better in the lives of the poorer Filipinos, it served a good purpose. Insofar as it created an artificial sense of prosperity that could not be sustained, it was deceptive.

Some of the wiser Filipino legislators realized that the imposition of the terms of the legislation, beginning with the progressively increasing export taxes to be levied in 1941, would bring immediate hardship. Because of this Filipino concern, Washington re-examined the Tydings-McDuffie Act and subsequently the act was amended. It provided that the quotas set forth earlier should continue, but that the more onerous provisions should not come into effect until 1961. The basic economic problem was not solved, but postponed.

The next matter of concern was national defense. Again, the Filipinos were optimistic. It is impossible to appraise what happened without some knowledge of the unique position and prestige of General MacArthur. More than any other then living American, he had a close attachment to the Philippines. General MacArthur's father had served in the islands, and the General himself had served as commander of the entire Philippine Department. The question of the defense of the Philippines had been debated in Congress and legislation was introduced to provide for an American military mission to the islands that would assist in planning that defense. Upon his retirement in 1935 as Chief of Staff, General MacArthur was named to head that mission.

President Quezon made national defense the first order of business. Upon the very good plan for defense which the President and General
MacArthur had drawn up was a very serious limitation -- that of the economy. A plan was set in motion that intended to have an effective military defense installation in 10 years. Because of a shortage of trained officers, non-commissioned officers, and money the program outlined moved fairly slow.

One danger which was far more acute than some realized was the Japanese intention of invasion. At the time the Japanese invaded the islands the Army was small, and partly trained. The "mosquito fleet", as the Navy was called, was practically nonexistent, and the Air Force was totally inadequate. A large number of airplanes which had been sent to the Philippines were still crated on the docks when the Japanese struck.

B. The Effects Of The Japanese Occupation.

1. The heroism shown in the defense of Bataan and Corregidor made history. It may have also influenced it. It was not possible for the U. S. to give further assistance and therefore the Filipinos and Americans were forced to fight a delaying action against the Japanese. The Filipino resistance had proved more than the Japanese had bargained for and therefore they were forced to commit larger forces to occupy the Philippines. This lag in time proved beneficial to the allies. In the long run, however, the greatest thing that came out of Bataan was not military, but political and social. Filipinos and Americans fought side by side in a common cause. Bataan thus became a symbol to the Philippines of the value and the triumph of an idea.

2. The Japanese soon realized that the Filipinos, in the main, hated and despised them and all they stood for. There was active guerrilla
resistance. A lack of understanding and the consequent chagrin may account, in part, for the almost incredible stupidity of the Japanese occupation policies. If these had been genuinely benevolent and if the Japanese had really made some concession to the Filipino desire for freedom they might possibly have won some support for their cause.

3. Instead of benevolence and understanding, however, the Japanese brought an outrageous arrogance and calculated cruelty that made more and more enemies for them. Some of their bad behavior can, no doubt, be attributed to the mere ignorance of junior officers and enlisted men who had never before been outside of Japan and who, after having themselves been repressed, found an outlet in a conquered country.

It is true that the Japanese had rather ostentatiously proclaimed the "independence" of the Philippines. They set up a puppet republic with the help of some Filipinos who were willing to cooperate with them.

4. The Japanese did make attempts to win over the Filipino mind. They organized youth societies, but destroyed their value by dictating everything that could be said or done in them. They took control of newspapers and radio, and made it plain that they would determine precisely what the Filipinos were to print or hear. This was a far cry from freedom of speech as the Filipinos had known it. Any Japanese propaganda was handicapped by the extent of atrocious Japanese behavior. Hundreds of Filipinos suspected of anti-Japanese feelings or activities were tortured and killed.
5. The Filipino guerrilla activity -- the value of intelligence.

Actual physical damage done by the guerrillas to the Japanese occupying force was not large, although considerable casualties were inflicted. But the guerrillas served a great purpose. In the first place, they kept alive the idea of continued Filipino resistance. The people were unconquered as long as those units operated "in the hills."

Hardly less important was the fact that the guerrillas were able to serve as a large intelligence network. American submarines operated in Philippine waters from the beginning of the war and they kept up steady contact with residence units. One unit of the resistance, for example, was credited in an official American citation with having supplied the information that led to the sinking of some fifty Japanese ships in Philippine waters. General MacArthur is reported to have said that "We have history's most effective fifth column working with us in the Philippines."

C. The Liberation.

1. Return Of The Civil Government

American forces made their dramatic landing on Leyte Island on October 20, 1944. General MacArthur had returned. But something else had returned as well. This was free civil government. At the time of the Japanese invasion the United States had taken Commonwealth President Quezon and Vice President Osmena out of the islands. President Quezon died in the United States on August 1, 1944, and Mr. Osmena succeeded him in the presidency of the Commonwealth. Within three days, in a formal
ceremony at Tacloban, the Leyte capital, General MacArthur turned over the civil government to President Osmena with the declaration that he was restoring government by constitutional process under the regularly constituted Commonwealth government as rapidly as the occupied conditions would permit.

2. Filipino Civil Affairs units had gone ashore with the troops from the beginning and they began to function. Schools were re-opened, civil hospitals set up, and relief supplies distributed.

3. Manuel Roxas presented himself as a candidate for election as president early in 1946. He had served in several capacities under the Japanese and he had been called a "collaborator." General MacArthur had attached Mr. Roxas to his staff with a statement that he had been in continuous touch with Mr. Roxas, who had been loyal and faithful to the United States. The implication that Mr. Roxas had served in some counterintelligence capacity was obvious, and his exoneration was accepted as complete. Mr. Osmena had decided not to be a contestant for the Presidency.

4. As a war measure, the United States Congress in June 1944, had authorized the President to advance the date of the grant of Philippine independence if it were deemed advisable. An early date was not deemed necessary, and on July 4, 1946, the independence of the Republic of the Philippines was formally inaugurated and Mr. Roxas was sworn in as its first President.

II. Tribulations of a New State.

A. The Broad Economic Chaotic Situation.

The broad economic situation was chaotic. Long before production for export could be restored there was a wildly clamorous market for
imports. The Filipinos had been deprived of necessities, amenities, and luxuries for four years, and they were "hungry" in more sense than one. When the United States assistance began to put some degree of purchasing power into Filipino hands, imports ran wild. In that first year for independence they reached almost 300 million dollars. A year later the imports were still double the value of total exports.

There was a critical shortage of textiles, food items, building materials, and the luxuries not normally considered essential. The people wanted such items as lipstick, nylons, and Cadillac automobiles. The United States paid the country 400 million dollars in war damage claims. Private capital was slow in coming forth. Simple living costs rose. The index of living cost in 1946-47 was approximately six to one over the last prewar years of 1939-41.

B. The Problem Of The Disposal Of American War Surpluses.

A transfer to the Philippines of 220 million dollars worth of Army surplus property was authorized. Some of the worst offenses and abuses stemmed directly from what could and should have been a gigantic aid program. A double process was set up. Some items, such as vehicles and heavy machinery were turned over directly to government agencies. The remainder - by far the largest part - was put up for sale at auction, with the proceeds to accrue to the government. What happened was appalling. In the first place, the material was not properly warehoused and guarded, and theft was widespread. The charge that the American guards, as well as Filipinos, connived at this was published in the Manila newspapers.

Theft, even widespread as it was, did not reach the proportions of losses that came from the scandalous sales. The American inventories
were totally inadequate and often false. The communist-inspired line "get the troops home" was strongly felt by the Americans. In addition, the surplus property disposal was one last unpleasant chore for men eager to get home, and their inclination was to get it over as quickly as possible.

Items were auctioned off by case lots and by number. Often the cases were incorrectly labeled. Airplane engines and even surgical instruments were sold under the label of "scrap metals." One lucky Filipino bought, for a few pesos, a case of microscopes that was labeled "socks." A substantial part of the surplus found its way into a black market and thus eventually satisfied some consumer needs. But it was sold at fantastic profits and contributed to the general inflationary trend.

C. The loss to Philippine morale and reputation was obvious. The monetary loss was also substantial. The government eventually realized less than one-fifth of the value of the materials whose transfer had been authorized. The final total was only forty million dollars. And in the meantime a pattern of private and public corruption had been established and accepted which persisted for several years.

D. The Collaboration Issue.

It was against this background of economic chaos and to some extent of moral breakdown that the Filipinos and Americans tried to come to grips with one of the most complex and troublesome of problems in the society, that of previous collaboration with the Japanese. The Japanese had actually forced certain officials to serve in the "so-called" independent government under the occupation. Some complaints of collaboration were obviously given in spite to settle personal grudges.
E. Creeping Corruption

1. President Manuel Roxas died suddenly in April 1948, after less than two years in office. Many Filipinos felt that this was the most severe blow that the young nation could have suffered. Mr. Roxas was a dynamic and forceful leader and he gave the people a strong administration. Mr. Quirino became president and as such he was a weak executive. This lack of strong leadership allowed a depredation of some of the officials of government.

2. The creeping corruption began at the very lowest levels of government and extended all the way to the top, except for the president himself. The clamor became so intense that President Quirino was obliged to call a caucus of his chief supporters and tell them that there must be a "clean-up" campaign. Much of the value of this move was lost when one of the newspapers put a reporter under an open window of the room at the presidential palace in which the caucus was held. His paper came out the next morning with a partial transcript on the meeting in which one of the persons closest to the President was quoted as having said: "But what's the use of being the majority party if we can't have a little honest graft?"

3. Politically a crisis came in the election of 1949. Mr. Quirino was the candidate of his Liberal Party. He was opposed by Jose P. Laurel of the Nacionalistas who obviously wished to establish, once and for all, that the charge of collaboration that had been brought against him was unfounded. Attacks on the administration were savage. What eventually happened bore out some of the charges. This election
quickly became known in Philippine annals as the "dirty" election. The Liberals took advantage of their majority party position to "fix" the naming of election inspectors and the counting of ballots. Much more, they turned out "goon squads" to intimidate the voters or to keep them away from the polls. There were scores of clashes and several hundred persons lost their lives. In the end, Quirino and his Liberals won.

III. The Hukbalahap Revolt.

A. The Huks in Retrospect.

In retrospect it is possible to see that what happened followed a definite plan in which the Communists had been carefully schooled. They were instructed to take advantage of the nationalist movement wherever they could and to capture them if possible. They were trained to capitalize on discontent and to foment it. The conditions after the war in the Philippines were suited to these purposes.

1. The Communist party in the Philippines was organized as early as 1930. That date is usually chosen because it was in that year, or late in 1929, that Tan Malaka, the Indonesian Communist leader, paid a quiet visit to Manila. But he found at hand several Filipinos who had already been to Moscow and had had their basic training in Marxism-Leninism. The two most important were Guillermo Cappadocia and Mateo de Castillo. They became the real founders of the party. Cappadocia continued in positions of importance for almost twenty years.

Leadership in Manila was soon taken over by a rising young labor leader, Crisanto Evangelista. He made the mistake of trying to get direct action too soon. In addition to preaching the Communist doctrine, he
stirred up a series of strikes that could not be ignored. In 1932 he was arrested and charged with sedition. He was convicted and his Communist party outlawed. In 1934 he was pardoned and the legal status of the party was gradually restored. The peasant uprisings in 1936 have been blamed to some extent on the communists. The uprising was a protest against absentee landlordism, provincial maladministration, and what seemed to be government indifference.

2. The hard core of the Hukbalahap movement took shape in the later days of the Japanese occupation. The members were guerrillas and they fought the Japanese. More than that, they accumulated a sizable store of weapons and ammunition. Still further, they came under the leadership, by 1945, of a dedicated Communist, Louis Taruc. It became clear immediately after the war that the Huks were not just another guerrilla group. They had maintained their own unique organization and had not cooperated with other resistance units. They had set up indoctrination schools and eventually their own politburo. The large center of their postwar activity was in central Luzon, north of Manila, but there were branch operations in two provinces south of the capital and several in the central islands. At the time of the liberation the Huks refused to join with other guerrillas in presenting their case to the Americans as veterans. And most important, they refused to surrender their arms.

3. In 1946 the Huks openly declared their Communist orientation, and took the field as an antigovernment Hukbalahap party, and actually elected seven men to the legislature. The legislature refused to seat
them and Taruc, who was one of those elected, went back to the countryside and raised the standard of armed revolt against the government.

4. By a combination of promises and terrorism he obtained a fairly large following in central Luzon. The condition of the rice farmers was pitiful and the promise of land was persuasive. The Huks made the most of every type of discontent — and discontent was all too abundant. Luis Taruc had boasted that the mighty power of the great Soviet Union was behind his revolt. It cannot be established whether the Huks actually received direction from Moscow. However, the Soviet Union did occasionally express sympathy for the righteous cause of the Huks.

5. How large the Huk force actually became could not be accurately established. Taruc boasted that he had 30,000 trained and equipped regulars under arms and at least a million peasant supporters in the countryside. This estimate of the Huk force may not be true; however, the area north of Manila stretching almost to the Benquet mountains came to be known, with a false jocosity, as "Huklandia." Even in Manila it was not safe to wander abroad at night. The very tension of terror that prevailed was paralyzing.

6. When the Huks began their systematic raids and attacks, constabulary units were sent out to "protect" the villages. It was not long before the charge was made that the depredations of the constabulary were as bad as those of the Huks. Constabulary units were accused of making off with everything that they happened to want and of "living off the manna," and many accused the Huks actually offered their services to protect the villagers against the constabulary.
7. The Army was called upon to stop the Huk movement, but the Army had no more success than the constabulary. There were fewer charges of looting villages, but the Army was ineffective. A barracks position was set up and from time to time a unit would go out to disperse the Huks. The soldiers would thereupon take the field, fire a few volleys into the air, and return to their post with the report, "mission accomplished."

8. A climax came in April 1949, when Mrs. Aurora Quezon, widow of the Commonwealth President, was ambushed and murdered by the Huks. Mrs. Quezon was killed along with several high government officials. The Army was ordered to step up its campaign, but its operations were hampered by the fact that the Huks' intelligence net was more effective than the Army's.

B. All this time the Huks were creeping closer and closer to Manila itself. It became known that the politburo was actually living in and working from the capital. Finally, a target date was set. Manila was to be taken on Christmas Eve, 1950. That was the situation when Ramon Magsaysay appeared on the scene.

IV. The Triumph of Democracy through Military-Civil Programs.

A. Ramon Magsaysay.

1. The life of Magsaysay has occasionally been over dramatized. We commonly speak of the "man of the hour" or the "man of destiny." Both terms have been applied to Ramon Magsaysay. Ramon's father was a village schoolteacher and a part-time carpenter and blacksmith. The atmosphere in which Ramon, second in a family of eight children, grew up
was that of emphasis upon the value of learning and of devotion to it. The family believed in making its way and paying its debts. Advancement was taken for granted. Ramon was born August 31, 1907, in the province of Zambales, the island on the west side of the Island of Luzon, north of Bataan and facing the South China Sea.

Ramon was an inquisitive boy. He acquired an old Ford automobile and traveled the roads of Zambales in his "spirts" around the countryside.

After graduation from high school, he went to Manila to further his education. Ramon enrolled in the University of the Philippines, but did not find the atmosphere congenial, and he transferred to a smaller institution, Jose Rizal College, where he graduated with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce.

While in college Ramon worked as a mechanic for a transportation company. After his graduation from college, he married the daughter of the owner of the transportation company for whom he had worked. Ramon was returned to his home island of Zambales in the employment of the transportation company. Then came the war. After a brief service with the American forces, Magsaysay was instructed to get back to Zambales, avoid capture, and organize an underground resistance. Ramon's knowledge of the roads, mountains, and the people of that area were invaluable to him. The Japanese placed a great price on his head, but Ramon could not be found. Magsaysay's force symbolized the true resistance to Japan in western Luzon.

2. It is hard to realize the impact of Magsaysay upon the Philippine political scene without a better understanding of just what he was and was not. Ramon was destined to break all political rules. He was not a lawyer,
he was not a professional politician, he had no political debts, no family interests to fulfill, and he had no organization backing him. On the other hand, he had all the potentials of a good leader.

B. Magsaysay's Campaign As Secretary Of Defense Against The Huks.

In September 1950 at the request of President Quirino, Ramon Magsaysay became Secretary of Defense. This was Ramon's biggest opportunity. The speed and vigor with which he acted came as something of a welcome shock, even to those who knew him and trusted him. On his first day in office he abruptly dismissed several very high ranking Army officers. On his second day he sent some men, supposedly permanent "armchair" fixtures, into the field. Thereafter, he bombarded the whole Army command with a series of crisp, often curt, directives. Even more frequently he issued his orders in person.

There was a complete overhaul of Army dispositions and tactics. The barracks positions were quickly disposed of. Units were cut down in size and made and kept fully mobile. Before long the Army units were able to move with speed equal to that of the Huks. It was necessary to regain the confidence of the people themselves and ridding them of the barracks burden was one way of doing so. This was coupled with the most drastic orders against living off the country. Magsaysay had to wipe out the bad impression that had been made by the constabulary and to a lesser degree by the Army. The rations were increased for Army personnel and soldiers were told to use their rations and nothing else. Any charges of looting were promptly investigated and the offenders summarily punished. As time passed, the Huks began to get less help and less information from
the villagers. Magsaysay disposed of the old method of false claims of success by the Army units. Previously Army units would go out and fire a few shots into the air and report so many killed and return—mission a success. Magsaysay equipped each unit with a camera and each dead Huk had to be photographed.

The Huks had a careful plan to take Manila. The politburo had a very good intelligence network operating out of Manila. Their exact location was carefully detected and many of the politburo were captured in a raid by the Army. The break-up of the politburo resulted in confusion in the Huk camp.

C. The Clean Election of 1951.

During this time, it should be emphasized, Magsaysay had enjoyed the complete and outspoken support of President Quirino. It was not always easy for the President to give it, since Magsaysay had a way of treading upon official toes, and some of the toes that were hurt belonged to Quirino’s close friends, associates and supporters. There were rumblings that Magsaysay was getting too big for himself and should be put in his place. Quirino stood by him.

The growing cry of the dirty elections of 1949 and appeals for a clean election in 1951 grew. The President called upon the Secretary of Defense for assistance. He asked the Secretary to see that ballot boxes were safeguarded, that there be no obstruction to voting, and that the public be reassured.

The use of the Army gave spectacular results. Soldiers were used to guard the voting areas to guarantee orderly balloting. A communications
set-up was used to assure an early reporting of ballots, and the radio and press reported the results to the public within 24 hours.

While this was a senatorial election, politically, this election was important to the Philippines. It demonstrated that an entrenched party in power could be repudiated by a free electorate. Quirino’s party had suffered a devastating defeat. The most important result was the fact that the Filipino again felt free to vote for his own choice.

D. Magsaysay’s Rising Popularity and His Inevitable Break With The Administration Of President Quirino.

Magsaysay’s break with Quirino was slow, but inevitable. Quirino’s popularity began to fade, and Magsaysay’s increased. The resettlement program was becoming successful in fighting the Huks; however, Magsaysay’s proposals were beginning to receive little governmental support. At this time, Quirino and Magsaysay no longer spoke the same language. Quirino and Magsaysay disagreed on the method of handling the rehabilitation of the Huks - the result, Ramon Magsaysay resigned in 1953 as Secretary of Defense.

E. Ramon Magsaysay Becomes President in Another Free Election.

Magsaysay, coupled with the efforts of Romulo, took their cause to the people. The outcome was never in doubt. Magsaysay obtained the largest popular vote in Philippine history, and the widest margin of victory. A president had been elected not by one party or its machine, but as the representative of a whole people. Democracy had returned.

F. Civil-Military Projects.

The Economic Development Corps constituted the major civic endeavor of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
President Magsaysay, burdened with new executive responsibilities, tried to go ahead with certain specific projects that were designed to provide better living conditions for those in need. Most conspicuous of these was the land resettlement program, which had been of primary interest to his operations while he was Secretary of Defense. He had felt the best way to beat the Huks was to offer some concrete plan of rehabilitation to those who wished to get away from the conditions that the Huks had successfully exploited. Out of this came the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR), a branch of military service charged with the administration of land development projects for purposes of rehabilitation.

The Island of Mindanao was chosen as a site for the resettlement. Obstacles were enormous. The land was totally different; there were few roads and plenty of forest and jungle. Provisions had to be made for tools, work animals, and basic rations. A small nucleus of ex-Army men moved into these areas along with the other settlers as farmers. These people gave a stabilizing effect to the program. Less than 10% of the settlers gave up. Farm communities were constructed, a vocational rehabilitation center established, and one complete barrio moved and re-established in a more favorable area. The farm communities were recruited from selected Huk prisoners, volunteer retired military personnel, and civilian applicants.

Mindanao, as mentioned previously, was the first of two farm communities to be established. The Army moved small units to the area (a standard became a unit of 12 officers and 91 enlisted men) to scrape in dirt roads, establish security, and to construct initial housing to receive the settlers upon arrival. Troops and settlers then worked together to clear the jungle for farming, to construct family housing and community
centers, schools, chapels, and dispensaries, to operate sawmills, to put in wells, to build markets, and to construct sanitary facilities. The Army arranged for the settlers to earn title to the land, and handled the legal difficulties of land ownership in the Philippines. EDCOR land is owned by homestead patent and by Torrens title. Similar procedures were followed in establishing the next two farm communities -- at Echague, Isabela in 1953, and at Midsayap, Cotabato, in 1954. The EDCOR administration reports that healthy progress has been made in making these farm communities independent in collecting reimbursable indebtedness from the settlers, and in security and stability of the entire areas surrounding the communities. No organized resurgence of dissidence has been observed.

Two other EDCOR projects are worthy of mention. One is the rehabilitation center; the second is the moving and re-establishment of a barrio. The EDCOR Rehabilitation Center was founded by Magsaysay as a means of vocational training of surrendered Hiks, who had broken with Communist doctrine, had given assistance to the Army, and who had needed a fresh start in life. A small woodworking shop was established in part of an Army warehouse, and this center soon started producing furniture for barracks and Army officers, with profits going to the workers. This has been a highly successful enterprise.

While the establishment of EDCOR farms in Mindanao was a dramatic undertaking, the second was far removed from the major combat zone in Central Luzon. An example of the Army's offer of "all out friendship" to those who needed it, close at hand where it could be seen, was necessary to induce the civilian cooperation and Huk surrender. The Army
selected San Luis, Pampanga, the center of Huk activities and the home
town of the Huk military chief, Luis Tarac, where bad economic condi-
tions had been strongly exploited by communists in obtaining support for
the Huks. The Army survey of the area showed one barrio of San Luis will­
ing to be helped by the Army, and the government land several miles away
across the river in the rough Candaba Swamp vacant and available for
homesteading. The barrio volunteered and the Army moved the barrio to a
new site. The Army cleared and drained the new area for housing and farm­
ing. It bridged the river, moved the more substantial houses, built new
housing to replace the houses which couldn't be moved, put in fresh water
wells, built a grammar school for children, and helped the farmers to seed,
and gave agricultural advice to plant the land. Word of this undertaking
spread rapidly by word-of-mouth and many Huks surrendered, stating that
they refused to fight against the troops who were so helping the families of
the Huks. Magsaysay believed this action was more decisive than the deploy­
ment of several battalion combat teams.

SECTION II. EDCOR PLAN

I. Basic Objective

A. General.

1. To rehabilitate both socially and economically the great masses
of our people who need a new start.

2. To populate large, uncultivated tracts of land in order to dis­
tribute population from the congested to the less congested areas.

3. To embark on an agricultural program geared to the needs of the
resettlement project with the end in view of recovering in whole or in part
money invested in the resettlement project.
4. To solve the peace and order problems by establishing peaceful, law-abiding towns.

5. To organize model communities in many parts of the Philippines, peopled by peaceful, progressive citizens.

6. To give landless persons a chance to own a piece of land at low cost through their own efforts.

7. To produce new money crops to hasten economic self-sufficiency.

8. To pioneer in the establishment of new home industries.

9. To provide training in agriculture for trainees while undergoing military training.

B. Immediate.

1. To take over surrendered or captured dissident elements, who are neither indicted nor convicted by civil courts for the purpose of reeducating them in the democratic, peaceful and productive way of life.

2. To open resettlement projects in fertile but unpopulated areas where settlers will be given a chance to own a home and farm lot.

3. To operate EDCOR Farms which will conduct experiments and later produce on a commercial scale for the purpose of recovering in whole or in part the money invested in the project.

4. To establish poultry, piggery, and other livestock projects for eventual resale to settlers at cost or to continue as a profit producing program.

5. To show by example to people who have been lured away by communism that democracy is the better ideology.

6. To prove by concrete, definite actions that the government is sincere in the implementation of its social and economic amelioration program.
7. To provide convenient credit facilities to settlers, especially at the initial stage of the project.

II. Who Can Be Settlers.

A. The following may apply as settlers.

1. Surrendered or captured dissident elements who are neither indicted nor convicted by the courts.

2. Ex-servicemen and guerrillas.

3. Trainees who desire to continue farming after the completion of their training period.

4. Other Filipino citizens who satisfy the requirements of EDCOR.

B. All settler-applicants must possess the following qualifications:

1. Must be a Filipino citizen.

2. Must be 18 years old or over, or head of a family.

3. Must have an agricultural background or at least an inclination to it.

4. Must have no pending case in court.

5. Must not belong to any subversive organization.

6. Must be willing to sign a contract agreeing to all the terms of EDCOR.

III. Section of Settlers.

Initially, settlers to EDCOR projects will be recruited from surrendered or captured dissident elements all over the Philippines. Screening of prospective settlers will be done by a committee composed of representatives of EDCOR as Chairman, and with representatives of G-1 and G-2 as members.
The number of settlers to be sent at any given time will depend upon the availability of temporary quarters at the settlement sites. The Farm Administrator or his representative will certify from time to time as to the number of additional settlers that can be accommodated.

As soon as all dissident elements have been accommodated, applicants will be screened from the following elements in order of preference:

1. Ex-servicemen.
2. Former guerrillas.
3. Applicants already in the vicinity of the settlement site but also who do not own a piece of land.
4. All other applicants who may be recruited by recruiting officers or who may apply direct to the EDCOR office.

In the screening process, the following points will be considered:

1. Physical fitness.
2. Agricultural background or aptitude for farming and livestock raising.
3. Ownership of work animals and farm implements.
4. Sincere desire to begin a new life.
5. Number of dependents who can help in farm work.
6. Present financial condition.

IV. Transportation and Accommodation of Settlers.

Commanding Officers of military areas concerned will be responsible for the transportation, security, billeting, and mess of settlers from their respective homes or collecting points to Port of Embarkation. COs of military areas may request transportation facilities from the QMG to effect movement of settlers and their families to Port of Embarkation.
Commander, FN, will be responsible for the transportation, security, and mess of settlers from Port of Embarkation to Port of Debarkation.

Commander, EDCOR, will be responsible for transportation, security, billeting and mess of settlers from Port of Debarkation.

Subsistence of settlers and their families from the time they arrive at Port of Embarkation will be chargeable against EDCOR funds.

V. Interim Period.

Upon arrival at settlement site, settlers and their families will be accommodated in temporary family barracks or settler's huts, depending on their availability. Settlers will be allowed to draw supplies from the EDCOR store to be charged against their account.

As soon as practicable, a home lot will be assigned to a settler on which he should plant food crops, especially vegetables. This will enable him to have vegetables even before he moves to his new hom.

Whenever possible, EDCOR will build the settler's house so that the settler may have a house upon arrival. Cost of labor and materials of this house will be charged to the settler. If the settler feels that he needs a larger place, he may enlarge his house through his own efforts or through carpenters paid for by EDCOR and charged to the settler's account.

Where the construction of a house by EDCOR is not feasible, it will be built by the settler himself through the help of other settlers or paid carpenters who will work under the supervision of the settlers. This method has the advantage of allowing the settler to plan his own
house, thus making him more attached to it. It is also more economical in the long run.

During this period, services of settlers may be used for the development of EDCOR projects such as farms, poultry or piggery, and for which reasonable wages in cash or kind will be paid to the settler.

VI. Credit System.

The basic plan for settlers should be one where the EDCOR helps the settler help himself. The settler will thus have greater pride in his work and also feel that his government has merely given him a chance to have a decent start in life. Most men need only initial help and can be left alone once they are on the way.

Outright charity pampers the lazy and shames the diligent settler. Aside from the staggering cost to the government, there is also the question of personal pride in accomplishment. The bounty of the government should be extended only to those who are willing to improve themselves.

In the case of surrendered or captured dissidents, to give everything free would be to reward dissidents and punish law-abiding citizens. All other settlers do not get this consideration. The government should therefore give the same conditions at least as were given the settlers of the former NLSA, which, by the way, are very reasonable.

All settlers' needs, such as work animals, farm implements, carpentry tools, food, clothing, and other household necessities should be advanced in kind to the settler and charged to his account. These supplies should be issued through the EDCOR store which should keep all essential necessities always in stock.
Advances to settlers in kind should be limited to a quota of one peso daily for all persons over ten and fifty centavos for those below 10, provided that the settlers be not allowed to draw more than 1000 pesos a year for food, clothing, and household necessities. These quotas may be increased or decreased as the need for it arises.

Based on above quota, advances to settlers may be estimated as follows:

Subsistence, clothing and household necessities for 1 year  P 1,000.00
Work Animal 350.00
House 250.00
Farm Implements 110.00
Transportation 50.00
Other services 100.00

Total  P 1,860.00

No cash will be advanced to the settlers. All his needs will be given in kind, chargeable to his account. Should the settler work in an administrative project where he is to receive wages, his quota should be reduced or suspended for the duration of his employment, especially if his earnings exceed his quota. This will reduce his indebtedness.

The settler will be given at most five years to pay his account. However, after the first crop year, and every year thereafter, the settler should start amortizing his loan by giving thirty per centum (30%) of his yield. When the settler gets an income from his crop, his advances
for subsistence, clothing, and household necessities should be suspended for a definite period to be determined by EDCOR.

In later years, advances to settlers will be determined by the extent of the settlers' improvements. If the settler has shown interest in working his lot and has enough improvements to show for his work, further credit may be extended to him.

VII. Development Plan for Settler.

A. Home Lot. As soon as practicable, a home lot will be issued to the settler within a townsite. The establishment of a well-ordered community, complete with all the essentials of a modern town, should be the primary objective of EDCOR. Administration buildings, barracks, schoolhouse, church, parks, markets should be adequately located in a master community plan to be followed in all EDCOR settlements. This plan may serve as a model for all communities to be built later on.

On the home lot EDCOR or the settler will build the settler's house, which should be cheap but practical. As much as possible, materials available within the vicinity of the site should be utilized.

EDCOR will draw up a plan for the home lot which should include a place for vegetables, fruit and shade trees, toilets, garbage pit, a piggery and poultry project, and a small flower garden. The settler should follow this development plan and the EDCOR should provide cuttings, seedlings, and other planting materials for vegetables, fruit trees, etc. Settlers should also be required to fence their lots so they will look trim and homelike.
For the first and succeeding batches of settlers, distribution of home lots for any given group should be by lottery so as to preclude favoritism in the issuance of lots.

B. Farm lot

Immediately after survey, farm lots of at least six hectares will be issued to settlers.

The EDCOR agricultural experts will determine from time to time what food and money crops to plant, having in mind always the welfare of the settler and the benefits to the country. Agriculturists of EDCOR should insure that only the best seeds of any major crops are planted and that settlers are properly instructed in the method of planting these crops. The EDCOR should continually experiment on better ways of planting various crops so as to produce the best results.

If sufficient farm machinery is available, opening of settlers' lots should be undertaken by EDCOR, which should prepare for planting one or two hectares or even more for the settler, depending upon the availability of farm machinery and time to do it in.

The EDCOR should see to it that the agricultural development plan is geared to the present economic needs of the country. If possible, the EDCOR should not compete in the production of crops already over-produced in other parts of this country. It should pioneer in the production of money crops which will make for economical self-sufficiency.

In the second and succeeding years, if the settlers have shown industry and resourcefulness in cultivating his lot, EDCOR should again open up one or more hectares for the settlers. Even when the settler
has been given title to his land, the EDCOR should continue to help
him prepare the land, provided farm machinery is available and pro-
vided always that the settler has demonstrated enough interest and can
show improvement in both his home and farm lots, which will make him a
good investment. Laziness should never be encouraged by taking over
work which the settlers should have done for themselves.

VIII. Issuance of Title.

No later than the end of five years, if the settler has paid up
all his indebtedness, has cultivated at least one fourth of his assigned
farm lot and complied with all the requirements of EDCOR, arrangements
will be made for the issuance of title to him for his home and farm lots.

Neither the home lot nor the farm lot shall be subject to any
lien or transfer nor shall they stand for the payment of any obligation
contracted previously by the settler from private parties. However,
prior to the vesting of title, if he proves to the satisfaction of the
EDCOR that it is impossible for him to continue with the cultivation of
the land through no fault of his, and he has no grown-up dependents who
can continue it for him and there exists a purchaser in good faith of
his rights and improvements and the transfer is not being made for specu-
lative purposes, the settler may, upon approval of the Chief, EDCOR,
transfer his rights to the land and improvements thereon to any person
having the legal qualification to own said lots. In case the settler
should suffer from mental derangement, incurable sickness, or death, or
for any reason whatever he should be incapacitated from further cultivating
the lots assigned to him, his legal heirs may continue working his lots.
In no case will a lot be transferred to any person who already owns in his name a lot of 24 hectares or more within or outside the settlement site.

IX. Trading Store

For the purpose of supplying the employees' and settlers' needs, and of marketing the settlers' produce, a trading store system shall be established by the EDCOR.

The EDCOR trading stores shall be located in all EDCOR sites and will carry in stock all the essential needs of the settlers.

It shall be managed by a trading store manager and his assistants who shall keep a record of all incoming and outgoing merchandise.

In order to keep personnel down to a minimum, a settler should be allowed to draw supplies only once a week, and they should be divided into six groups, one for each working day. This will enable store personnel to handle only a limited number of people daily.

A surcharge of 5% over landed cost should be imposed to take care of administration and other expenses.

The trading store manager should make contacts with buyers of settlers' produce in advance. All settlers' produce will be deposited at the trading store bodegas and corresponding quedans issued to the settlers. These quedans will be good for their value in cash at the trading store.

The trading store will negotiate for the sale of the produce at the most advantageous price to the settler and after deducting 5% for handling and 1/3 of the total cost, as amortization of the settlers' farm, it shall deliver the balance in cash to the settler.
X. EDCOR Projects

In order to provide income for EDCOR and a source of supply for settlers' needs and also to serve as experimental projects, the EDCOR should undertake the following projects:

A. EDCOR Farm. The EDCOR will reserve a definite area within the settlement site for experimental farms. These will be planted to various crops for experimental purposes. This will test the adaptability of the soil to these crops and serve as a guide for settlers. Besides, these farms will give income to EDCOR and enable it to return in part the huge outlay needed by the project.

B. Poultry and Piggery. The EDCOR should start without delay the operation of a poultry and piggery project. From this project, the EDCOR will issue two pullets and weanlings to every settler to serve as foundation stock for a home poultry and piggery project. The development of the settlers' lot will not be complete without a poultry and swine project.

Officers, employees, and enlisted men can get their eggs, fowl and pork supply from these projects. This will give more income to EDCOR. Feeds for this project ought to be plentiful as the EDCOR can produce practically all of them.

In due time, EDCOR may provide even outsiders with the beginnings of a small poultry and piggery at low cost, thus helping to foster a much needed industry.

C. EDCOR Goat Farm and Ranch. Where enough grazing areas are available, the EDCOR may also operate a ranch and goat farm. This will enable the EDCOR to have a source of supply for beef, cow's milk
and goat meat and milk, especially should the settlement site be located far from the source of beef. If sufficiently large, it can be the source of lucrative income for EDCOR and also provide employment to settler's dependents.

D. Other Projects. Other projects may also be started as the need for them arises. EDCOR experts should always be on the lookout for worthwhile and profitable undertakings which will be of practical use to the country.

XI. Social Welfare.

In line with the policy of the EDCOR to win the settler back to the ways of peace, every effort will be exerted to give the settlers a wholesome atmosphere in a democratic community. Attention will be paid to making democracy work.

A park will be one of the principal features of an EDCOR site. These parks will be improved so that settlers and their families may go there to foregather when their work is over. Playground equipment will be provided for the children.

In order to give wholesome recreation to settlers, athletic equipment of all kinds will be made available for daily use. Friendly contacts will be encouraged among the settlers.

Through community effort a library will be made available to both settlers and employees. These will be stocked with books and magazines in English, Spanish, and the dialects so they can be utilized by the settlers.

In collaboration with the Bureau of Public Schools, adult education classes will also be conducted for the benefit of illiterates.
Naturally, a school for children of settlers and employees will be constructed.

Medical officers of EDCOR will make periodical visits to all houses of settlers and employees to see that they are kept clean and neat. The EDCOR will help the settler to improve his home, provide it with a sanitary toilet, garbage pit, and all the essentials of a good home.

It is planned to organize Boy and Girl Scout Troops among children of settlers and employees so as to rear up the youth in the right direction. These young people will be given plenty of chances of leading a wholesome vigorous life.

The women-folk of the EDCOR will also be mobilized so that they too may improve themselves and their community. Representatives of the Bureau of Plant Industry, or experts from various branches of government will teach the women various ways of conserving food, cooking the crops raised by the settlers and utilizing the products of the locality for decorative or commercial purposes. Various useful home arts will be taught them so they will have something to do in their spare time. Such arts as weaving, basket making, mat weaving, hat making, twine making, and other simple but useful arts will be taught by women who know.

The same plan will be followed for the man. Carpentry, cobbling, blacksmithing, tinsmithing, metal-working in general, simple construction, pottery, and allied trades will be taught by experts to the settlers and their children.

In order to inculcate love of country, retreats will be conducted every afternoon so that the people will be constantly reminded of their country and their flag.
From time to time, social welfare committees will study and make reports on ways and means of socially improving the lot of the settlers.

XII. Health

A medical and dental officer will take care of the settlers' health.

Hospitals and dispensaries will be built in all settlement sites to render free medical and dental services.

The medical officer will also conduct periodic physical examination of settlers and employees so that the proper treatment for them may be recommended.

Every effort will be exerted to safeguard the settlers' health.

XIII. Discipline

As much as possible, the settler will be given freedom of action. Little or no attempt will be made to regiment his activities. No person or groups will prevent other settlers from leading a peaceful life.

Initially, settlement regulations will be promulgated for the good of all and strict compliance to them will be enforced.

As much as possible, the idea or atmosphere of a police state or a detention camp should be removed from the settlers.

All offenses will be dealt with in a humane but just manner.

XIV. Relationship Between Farm Officials and Settlers.

The EDCOR, being primarily a social rehabilitation project, depends for its success on the quality of the men who are to lead the settlers. Officers and men should set the model for the conduct of settlers.
From being hunted and persecuted so long, settlers have naturally become suspicious and apprehensive of the attitude of the government towards them. They will feel bitter against any attempt to coerce them. Underdogs for a long time, they will also resent being looked down upon or bullied, or even a mere suggestion of them.

Only officers and employees with broad understanding, patience, and tact should be assigned EDCOR projects. Where possible, officers and men who have at some time or other fought dissidents should not be given assignment at EDCOR.

Officers should mix with settlers as much as possible so as to gain their confidence.

XV. Trainee Instruction.

When funds and facilities are available, it is planned to train at least 500 trainees yearly at all EDCOR farms. Instructions will cover both the military and agricultural phases. At the end of the training period, trainees who desire to stay will be encouraged to do so and given their own home and farm lots. In this way, the government can recover in whole or in part money invested for trainees and will give these young boys training in earning a livelihood.